

SECURITY WITH WHITE BOX CRYPTOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT

This paper presents the study of white box cryptography. . In this paper a study of various papers is done, and in the reviewed paper we explain the white box cryptography for the security purpose. The main part of this paper covers the security assessment of white-box implementation. cryptographic primitives are designed to protect data and keys against black-box attacks.

Keywords: *Cipher, Delinearliniarization, Strategy, Security, Tabularization*

I. INTRODUCTION

As we know that we live in information society, we rely on the exchange and processing of information. Evidence of this evolution is rapid growth of communication network and trend awards complex software application with strong security requirement.

Increasing use of portable devices and wireless network are the examples of security requirement. Communication with friends and collegues via e-mail and chat; the launch of (interactive) digital television and other media platforms(e.g., iTunes); on-line banking and purchase of goods and services; online-gaming;GPS navigation; professional and social networks (e.g., LinkedIn and Facebook);and many more. In one way or another, these new trends affect our daily activities in many ways, at home and in our professional life. On the downside however, we become increasingly dependent on the information infrastructure that empower our information society, and hence potentially vulnerable to attacks on them. In recent years, this has been illustrated by attacks on Internet servers, credit card fraud, hacking of banking applications and on-line games, cell

phones and TV set-top boxes, phishing, privacy violation, botnet threat In order to support our information society for the next years, and take advantage of the opportunities that it enables, the need for trustworthy information infrastructure is growing. The trend towards complex software applications with strong security requirements, increasingly demands for qualitative protection

technologies. One prominent building block to enable information security is *cryptology*. The word cryptology is derived from the Greek words *krypty'os* meaning 'hidden', and *logos*, meaning 'word'. Strictly speaking, it is the science that studies how to hide confidential information. Cryptology comprises of two complementary fields. *cryptography* is the study and practice of hiding information, while *cryptanalysis* is the study of methods to obtain knowledge from hidden information.

The foundations of cryptography originate from Shannon, who is regarded as the founder of information theory. In his seminal work on a mathematical model for cryptography in 1948 [10],

II. OBJECTIVE

The objective of White-Box Cryptography is to implement cryptographic primitives in such a way that, within the context of the intended application, having full access to the cryptographic implementation does not present

any advantage for a computationally bounded adversary in comparison to the adversary dealing with the implementation as a black box.

The objectives of information security can be categorized into three main goals.

- Confidentiality – Concealing a message against unauthorized eavesdropping.
- Integrity – Protecting a message against tampering.
- Authentication – Refers to entity authentication, related to the identification of the (legitimate) parties, whereas data authentication is equivalent to integrity.

Depending on the application in which a cryptosystem is deployed, a number of other objectives can be formulated, such as non-repudiation, and availability.

A cryptosystem is designed in order to achieve these objectives, and a cryptographic cipher is a pair of algorithms that implements the encryption (E) and decryption (D) primitives for a cryptosystem. In accordance to Kerckhoffs' principle [14], the algorithms are public, while a (secret) key is used to instantiate a cipher.

III MODEL OF WHITE BOX

Cryptographic ciphers are generally designed in the standard cryptographic model named as the black-box model where the communication end points and computing environments are been trusted. Exist applications do not comply with this model, so for this new model needs to be formulated. We define the white-box model as the worst-case attack model, in which adversaries have full access to the implementation of cryptographic primitives, and complete power over their execution environment. Software obfuscation is an active field of research, and many other techniques have been proposed to protect software code and embedded data structures. However, no technique has been presented that is able to obfuscate cryptographic primitives such that a sufficient level of confidentiality of secret key information is obtained. As a result of these efforts, by the end of the nineties, it was believed to be impossible to hide computational information into software binaries. That is, information that is used at execution time (in contrast to passive information, such as watermarks). In the white-box model, the adversary has total visibility of the software implementation of the cryptosystem, and full control over its execution platform. One could refer to the white-box model as the worst-case model, where in contrast to grey-box models, it is impossible for an adversary not to comply with the this model. The white-box model is used to analyze algorithms that are running in an untrusted environment, that is, an environment in which applications are subject to attacks from the execution

IV. INITIAL STRATEGY OF WHITE BOX

The strategy proposed by Chow *et al.* [31] consists of transforming a given block ciphers into a randomized, key dependent network of lookup tables. This consists of three main steps-

1) Partial Evaluation

This can be done by embedding the key into operation by transforming the (fixed) S-boxes S_i into key dependent lookup tables T_i .

$$T_i(x) := S_i(x + K_i)$$

2) Tabularizing

In this process transforming of all components of the block cipher including the linear transformations into lookup tables is performed. This process may seem like 'black art' for those who are not familiar with white-boxing techniques. Also, there is no generic 'compiler' or algorithm for transforming a given algorithm into its

tabularized equivalent. Instead, in the literature, a list of techniques is presented by means of demonstration on white-box implementations of the DES and the AES.

3) Randomization and delinearization-

The reason why a transformation to lookup tables is used, is because lookup tables can implement any given function. Hence they are the ideal primitive to hide information. Observe a chain of three consecutive lookup tables in the network $L3 \circ L2 \circ L1$, where $L2$ contains some key information that needs to be hidden (e.g., $L2(x) = x \oplus k$). Because the description of the lookup tables is available to a white-box adversary.

V. SECURITY

The (black-box) security of any primitive is captured using a security notion where the adversary is given black-box access to some functionality (e.g., encryption), and a white-box implementation can be required to satisfy that security notion when the adversary is given access to at the function of white-boxed version. We would like an obfuscation to ensure that all the security notions are satisfied in the white-box variant when they are satisfied in the black-box. So from prior work, it is not fully clear if any of the existing definitions of obfuscation can be used to achieve such a aim. In respect to this a natural question arises that the obfuscator satisfying the virtual black-box property for a program P and some security notion that is satisfied when the adversary is given black-box access to P , can it be proved that the security notion remains satisfied when the adversary is also given access to the obfuscated program $O(P)$? A major area of study in cryptology involves formal security models to assess the security of cryptographic primitives. Formal security models specify how an adversary can interact with (legitimate users of) a cryptosystem, and what should be achieved in order to break the cryptosystem. We refer to Dent [30] for an overview of models in provable security, and their respective issues.

VI. CONCLUSION

From the above study we conclude that the main aim of White-Box Cryptography is to implement cryptographic primitives in such a way that they achieve a certain level of robustness against an adversary that has full access to and control over the implementation of the primitive. At some extent, this is related to code obfuscation, which attempts to hide certain characteristics of a program. Despite the fact that many formal models for obfuscation have been presented, white-box cryptography lacks foundations. This paper provides an initial step to bring the foundations of white-box cryptography to a same level as obfuscation. Our work made several contributions in this regard. We extend the notion of WBC to arbitrary cryptographic primitives and initiated a formal study of WBC by introducing precise definitions of what it means for a white-box implementation to be secure

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